How is ownership transparency being addressed across the defense industrial base?
On May 7, 2026, DoW issued a proposed Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) rule, DFARS Case 2021-D011, that would substantially expand requirements for identifying and mitigating risks associated with foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI). FOCI is defined as “a foreign interest has the power—whether through direct or indirect control, whether or not exercised—to direct or decide matters affecting the management or operations of a company in a manner that may result in unauthorized access to information or may adversely affect the performance of contracts or programs which support national security.”
The proposal implements Section 847 of the fiscal year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as amended. It would extend formal FOCI screening beyond the traditional population of cleared contractors. In general, the rule would apply to DoW prime contracts and subcontracts at any tier valued above $5 million, including contracts involving only unclassified work. Commercial products and commercial services would generally be excluded unless DoW determines that an acquisition presents national security or sensitive information risks. DoW estimates that nearly 40,000 entities could be affected
Under the proposed framework, covered offerors would generally need eligible status in the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s (DCSA) National Industrial Security System (NISS) before contract award. The process would require submission of Standard Form (SF) 328, Certificate Pertaining to Foreign Interests, along with supporting ownership and beneficial ownership information.
If DoW identifies FOCI or beneficial ownership concerns, contractors could be required to implement mitigation measures, generally within 90 days. The proposed rule would also create continuing compliance obligations after award, including updates when ownership information changes, additional disclosures tied to certain contract modifications, renewals, and option exercises, and verification of NISS eligibility for covered subcontractors.
As of Aug. 28, 2026, the DFARS rule had not been finalized, though the public comment period closed July 6, 2026. Congress is also considering FOCI reforms through the FY 2027 NDAA process, signaling continued attention to ownership transparency across the defense industrial base.
How is GSA assessing supply chain risk in the commercial marketplace?
The GSA is also increasing its scrutiny of supply chain risk associated with commercial item vendors. In June 2026, GSA sought industry input on approaches to promote American-made products on GSA Advantage, including voluntary representations and a possible Special Item Number (SIN) for qualifying products. The initiative accompanied increased verification of domestic-origin claims, raising the importance of accurate component and country-of-origin data.
In July 2026, GSA introduced GSAR solicitation provision 552.540-70, Notice of Evaluation of Supply Chain Risk, and contract clause 552.540-71, Supply Chain Risk Monitoring. The provision formalizes consideration of supply chain risk during evaluations, while the clause addresses monitoring during performance and corrective action when risks cannot be reasonably mitigated. GSA’s acquisition policy library includes the GSAR Part 540 Provision and Clause FAQ for additional guidance.
GSA identifies public information, investigations, audits, disclosures, and commercial illumination tools as possible sources for supply chain risk information, including FOCI and “supply chain relationships, visibility, and controls.”
GSA also makes clear that this is broader than Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification (CMMC) compliance. The focus is on the security and integrity of the products, services, and solutions offered to the government, not on certification of a contractor’s internal network and processes to protect CUI.
How is NIST helping organizations understand supply chain risk?
Against this backdrop, NIST’s finalized Special Publication (SP) 1326, C-SCRM Due Diligence Assessment Quick-Start Guide, released in July 2026, provides a practical framework for navigating this evolving risk environment.
The guide distinguishes between basic due diligence, which relies primarily on publicly available information, and enhanced due diligence, which may incorporate commercial datasets, proprietary sources, and supply chain illumination tools. Although focused on information and communications technology (ICT) suppliers, the framework is relevant to A&D companies that depend on electronics, software, communications technologies, and digitally enabled components embedded in larger platforms and systems.
SP 1326 organizes due diligence activities around areas such as FOCI, provenance, resilience, foundational cybersecurity practices, and supply chain tiers. It encourages organizations to tailor diligence to supplier criticality, corroborate findings across multiple sources, establish levels of concern consistent with organizational risk tolerance, and consider continuous monitoring where appropriate.
Its broader lesson applies across supplier diligence: technology-enabled risk indicators can inform human analysis, but they do not replace validation and judgment. A tool-generated signal is a starting point for further review, not a self-executing determination.
What do these changes mean for A&D primes, OEMs, and lower-tier suppliers?
A&D primes and OEMs face the challenge of orchestration and program accountability
The government may look to an A&D prime or OEM not only to describe its own controls, but also to explain how it identified, prioritized and acted on risks throughout a multi-tier supplier network supporting a platform, weapon system or other mission capability.
- Primes may need to:
- Translate contractual clauses and program requirements into risk-based supplier expectations
- Define what ownership, provenance, component, material and risk information must be collected, validated and retained
- Establish appropriate contractual rights relating to notification, audit, corrective action and alternative sourcing
At the same time, indiscriminately imposing every requirement on every supplier can unnecessarily increase cost, extend lead times and drive capable commercial or dual-use suppliers from the defense market. A more prudent approach would calibrate diligence and monitoring to the criticality of the supplier, product or component while maintaining an evidence trail showing why a source was accepted, monitored, remediated, or replaced.
Lower-tier A&D suppliers should not equate the absence of a direct government contract with the absence of SCRM exposure
For A&D suppliers, requirements may arrive through mandatory flow-downs, supplier questionnaires, requests for bills of materials, component provenance, ownership and sourcing information, and obligations to support a prime contractor's reporting or corrective-action process. This can affect specialized manufacturers, electronics and software providers, material suppliers and other companies several tiers removed from the government customer.
As a practical matter, the compliance clock may also move faster at lower tiers: a prime facing a government reporting deadline may need validated supplier information in days rather than weeks.
Lower-tier A&D companies should therefore identify the federal programs and end items their products and services support, maintain current ownership, origin, component and upstream-supplier records, assign responsibility for rapid escalation and avoid representations that exceed what they can substantiate. They should also seek reasonable and workable notification and response periods that account for the prime contractor's own reporting and compliance obligations.
How can A&D companies prepare for deeper supply chain scrutiny?
A&D companies can begin by evaluating whether current SCRM processes are strong enough to support deeper mapping, monitoring, escalation, and documentation. The following actions can help contractors move from ad hoc diligence to a more repeatable operating model.
Steps to strengthen SCRM readiness
- Evaluate current practices and contract exposure. Assess current SCRM capabilities against applicable clauses, acquisition-specific plan requirements, and frameworks such as NIST SP 800-161 and the SCRM control family in NIST SP 800-53. Identify which contracts, systems, products, and suppliers create the greatest eligibility or performance risk, and clarify responsibilities across contracts, procurement, engineering, information security, operations, legal, and finance.
- Map and prioritize suppliers, components, and dependencies. Build a reliable supplier inventory and tier suppliers by mission impact. For higher-risk programs, capture parts, materials, software, authorized reseller status, country of origin, beneficial ownership, manufacturing locations, and known sub-tier relationships. Identify sole-source dependencies, concentration risk, and incomplete bills of materials.
- Assess vendors through layered due diligence. Use multiple sources of assurance. Questionnaires and certifications remain useful, but they can be supplemented, where appropriate, by exclusion-list screening, public records, financial and operational data, cyber information, and illumination platforms. Establish consistent methods to validate alerts, resolve conflicts, document sources, and assign risk ratings.
- Pre-wire mitigation and escalation pathways. This is arguably the most critical step. Before an illumination platform generates a high-risk alert, organizations should establish a clear framework for what happens when an alert is generated. That framework should define escalation thresholds, decision rights, legal and contracting review requirements, customer notification protocols, and executive approval authorities. It should also include practical response playbooks for recurring risk scenarios, such as prohibited-source exposure, FOCI concerns, supplier financial distress, cyber compromise, product authenticity issues, and sole-source dependency. Risk treatment should be tailored to the nature and severity of the issue and may include supplier corrective action, qualification of alternative sources, increased inventory buffers, enhanced testing, revised contractual flow-downs, heightened monitoring, segregation of sensitive work, logistics changes, or supplier replacement. Wherever possible, organizations should evaluate the cost, schedule, technical, and mission implications of these options before a crisis demands an immediate decision. Without this governance and response discipline, supply chain illumination can generate greater visibility—and more alerts—without meaningfully reducing risk.
What is the practical takeaway for A&D companies?
The federal acquisition system is building connective tissue among sourcing restrictions, entity lists, ownership screening, contract evaluation, ongoing monitoring and NIST due diligence practices. These expectations are likely to be most visible in major defense programs, where complex multi-tier supplier networks, specialized components and national-security considerations make supply chain visibility particularly consequential.
For A&D companies, SCRM is therefore becoming more than a procurement or compliance exercise; it is increasingly intertwined with program execution, supplier management, engineering decisions and resilience.
Supply chain illumination is becoming critical for A&D companies because it can reveal ownership relationships, sub-tier dependencies and other risks that questionnaires and first-tier visibility may miss.
Yet the differentiator will not be the number of alerts a platform generates. It will be the contractor's ability to validate a signal, understand its program and mission implications, make a defensible decision, implement an appropriate mitigation measure and demonstrate closure. The future of SCRM in A&D is not defined by how much of the supply chain an organization can see, but by how effectively it can turn that visibility into action - anticipating risk, remediating vulnerabilities and strengthening resilience before disruption affects production, sustainment or mission delivery.